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TAGS: [NATO](#) [PREL](#) [MARR](#) [MOPS](#) [IZ](#)  
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE: NTM-I MISSION CONTINUES AND EXPANDS FOR  
2007 PERIODIC MISSION REVIEW

REF: A. USNATO 585  
[1](#)B. USNATO 592

Classified By: David J. Kramer, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR/FO,  
Reason 1.4 (d)

[1](#)1. (C) SUMMARY. Washington is concerned with the NATO Policy Coordination Group's (PCG) cover letter and its brief overview of the Autumn 2007 Periodic Mission Review (PMR) of the NATO Training Mission - Iraq (NTM-I). Washington instructs USNATO to stress at all NATO NTM-I discussions and meetings that the NTM-I should continue its mission and also provide more training and courses based on Iraqi training requirements and the PMR, which are in accordance with Stage II of NATO OPLAN 10303 (NTM-I), and preserve all NTM-I permanent billets in Iraq at this time. Washington views that before NTM-I's mission in Ar Rustamiyah be discontinued, NATO should be implementing a comprehensive plan regarding future NTM-I training, based on the PMR recommendations. END SUMMARY.

[1](#)2. (C) NTM-I is a critical training resource for Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). It is uniquely placed to offer a wide range of training to junior, middle, and senior level military and civilian leaders in ISF. Iraq's Prime Minister Maliki has thanked NATO and the NTM-I commander for their commitment and their outstanding level of training. A conclusion of the entire NTM-I mission in 2008, as referenced in the PCG's cover letter, would adversely affect the level of military and civilian leadership throughout ISF, send a negative message of NATO's support to the Iraqi government, and counters the political objective and end-state of the NTM-I OPLAN, which is the creation of fully functioning and self-sustaining Iraqi security structures, accountable to the democratic Iraqi Government. Mission may point out that this end-state is not likely to be fulfilled in the scant months before the PMR is done.

[1](#)3. (C) According to SHAPE's PMR, "the GOI has signaled its confidence in NATO by seeking further assistance in training and mentoring of its Armed Forces, and in the acquisition of military equipment through NATO's Training and Equipment Coordination Group (NTECG). In this regard, NATO's presence in Iraq is likely to remain attractive to the Government." Washington agrees with this position and urges USNATO to highlight this statement at the PCG meeting with the understanding that NATO should be expanding cooperation in Iraq -- including the steps envisioned by the NTM-I PMR section on Additional Training Requirements -- not terminating it as implied in the PMR covering texts. Furthermore, the PCG document notes that "further formal requests from the Government of Iraq for continued NATO training support cannot be ruled out. Any adjustments to the NATO footprint at Ar Rustamiyah would need to take this into account." Washington also agrees with this statement and believes that we should avoid any reductions to the NATO footprint in Iraq at this time. While this stance does not

preclude the eventual departure of NTM-I permanent staff from Ar Rustamiyah as the PMR envisages, it lays down the marker that USG will not support closing the facility unless and until there is a clear plan, well-resourced by Allies, to respond to the full spectrum of GOI requests for NATO.

¶4. (C) Washington expects the Iraqi government to send a letter as early as the week of November 5 to NATO requesting additional training, which should be highlighted at the PCG discussion on November 9 and provide sufficient evidence to press Allies to respond. Absent a letter, USNATO can reference a July 17, 2007 letter sent from the head of Iraq's Navy, Rear Admiral Muhammad Jawad Kadhum to Major General Pompegnani, Deputy Commander of NTM-I, and meetings between the head of Iraq's Air Force and the NTM-I Commander that formally request additional training.

¶5. (C) The NTM-I mission at Ar Rustamiyah has been vital to the successful training and mentoring of current and future Iraqi military leaders. Washington does not want a reduction in the NTM-I staff requirement to be seen as signaling any change in the U.S. priority of maintaining a robust NTM-I mission in Iraq.

¶6. (C) To date, no Allied members have been asked to support mobile training teams (MTT) or training augmentation teams (TAT), as referenced in the PCG paper and SHAPE's PMR. Mission should begin raising with potential supporters the need for Allies to continue to plan and provide the political, personnel and financial resources necessary -- and for leaders to indicate now their willingness to do so. Otherwise, the combination of reducing the NTM-I footprint at Ar Rustamiyah with no Allied buy-in to commit trainers to the MTTs/TATs could create a vacuum of trainers to support the training laid out in the PMR and address the 147 training requirements for the Ministry of Defense, which in total demand thousands of trainers. The NTM-I commander acknowledges that NTM-I is a vital resource to address these training requirements.

¶7. (C) In contrast to the PCG's recommendation to "task the NMAs to provide advice in Spring 2008, including a status update on gendarmerie-type training and further details on potential additional training tasks," Washington would like USNATO to work with other Allies, especially Italy and other NTM-I contributors, to agree that at the next meeting on NTM-I, the PCG paper and the NAC should task NMAs to pursue and implement additional training tasks in response to Iraqi requests and the tasks laid out in SHAPE's Autumn 2007 NTM-I PMR, under Additional Training Requirements. Mission should judge whether to explicitly cite, along with the UK and any others who would, the PMR's statement that these tasks are within current OPLAN Stage II and as such need no political endorsement. In any case, creating maximum leeway to proceed with these new tasks is a top priority for this PMR.

¶8. (C) Looking ahead, Washington understands that the NTM-I OPLAN allows NATO to expand training support subject to further political guidance under Stage III of Phase II. It is our expectation that we would also support Stage III training and continued State II training, if requested by the Iraqis. Finally we are considering Mission's RFG in Ref B and will provide more guidance on the idea of early 2008 success in gaining an expanded NTM-I as a deliverable at the Bucharest Summit, perhaps in conjunction with a strategic NATO-Iraq Partnership along the lines of NATO's strategic partnership with Afghanistan.

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